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richardson,

Editor

EDITORIAL
The North American
Company’s Dividends

In the May issue of The Journal of
Accountancy we published somewhat

extended comment upon the policy of
The North American Company with reference to payment of
dividends upon the common stock. At that time we drew atten
tion to the almost unique plan of distribution of additional
stock instead of cash and pointed out that in reality this plan
represented not only distribution of profits in marketable form but
also of what was equivalent to “rights” to subscribe to stock at
prices below the current market quotation. This matter is of
interest to accountants who are concerned with the great ques
tions of financial structure of corporations, and our reference to it
was purely academic. After the comment appeared we received
a letter from Robert H. Montgomery questioning the validity of
our conclusions and criticising adversely the policy of the com
pany. This letter, with the consent of the writer, was referred
to Herbert C. Freeman, vice-president of the company, with the
suggestion that he reply to the arguments advanced by Colonel
Montgomery. We are glad to publish both comments herewith.
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy,
Sir: I have read with great interest your editorial in the May number

entitled “Financing by stock dividends.” You state: “ It seems, therefore,
that the best that can be said of the plan is that it has worked admirably
so far.” I am not at all sure that the plan has worked admirably so far.
I know several women who are so sure that the plan is an admirable one
that they have invested practically all their money in stock of The North
American Company. They justify themselves on the ground that the stock
pays higher dividends than probably any other stock in which they
could invest their money, and, as they need the income, they can not
afford to buy stocks which yield less. I asked several of them if they knew
what the earnings of the company are and in each case the answer has
been “No.” When asked as to what dividends the company pays, they
say that they receive between six and seven dollars a year in cash dividends.
It is beside the question to say that their statements are inaccurate. The
fact is that they believe it. When told that the company earns some four
or five dollars a year and can not possibly pay six or seven dollars in cash
dividends, they shrug their shoulders and say that the best evidence of a
dividend is the receipt of it, and that if the company did not earn the money
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it certainly would not pay it. The company has made it so easy to con
vert the stock dividends into cash that the stockholders who leave orders
with their bankers to sell the quarterly dividends either ignore or are ig
norant of the true status of the dividend. The sophisticated investor is
not deceived, but if my friends are typical of the general run of stockholders
of The North American Company they are far from being sophisticated.
The unsophisticated stockholder of a corporation who receives an extraor
dinary stock dividend may be assumed to be on notice that he is receiving
something which must not be treated as ordinary income, but when stock
holders regularly receive quarterly stock dividends in an amount which
does not strike them as being extraordinary, they are not to be blamed
for assuming that the cash equivalent of the quarterly dividend represents
a distribution of earnings equal in the aggregate to the cash value of the
quarterly dividends. Irrespective of the truth of the matter, they believe
that the company is paying at the present time about seven dollars a
year in what to them is the equivalent of cash, and that the company
would not be paying it if it were not earning it.
The matter is quite important from the standpoint of public account
ants and I hope that if there is another side to it some of your readers
will set me right. One solution which has occurred to me is that if the
auditors of the company were to insist that there be charged against
earned surplus the market value of the shares distributed as stock divi
dends, the whole plan would come to an abrupt end.
Yours truly,
Robert H. Montgomery.

Mr. Freeman’s letter follows:
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy,
Sir: I very much appreciate the privilege extended to me, with Colonel

Montgomery’s approval, of replying to his letter, regarding the dividend
policy of The North American Company, in advance of its publication,
in order that our communications may appear in the same issue of The

Journal of Accountancy.

When I read the editorial comment on “Financing by stock dividends”
I realized how provocative of discussion such a topic might well be. The
questions involved—practical questions and questions of principle—are
of profound interest and should be carefully studied by accountants.
And since specific reference was made in the editorial to the company with
which I am associated (The North American Company being the only
company paying common-stock dividends solely in stock), I had antici
pated the possibility of being drawn into the fray.
Imagine then my disappointment on reading Colonel Montgomery’s
letter! For, if I may say so without disrespect, it contains no argument
either for or against the practice of paying dividends in stock. It may be
a fact that some stockholders of The North American Company do not
understand the nature of a stock dividend. There are 30,122 holders of
common stock of the company, and among that number are some, un
doubtedly, who have not given the matter much thought. I had almost
said it must be a fact, since Colonel Montgomery says it is; but then the
thought occurred to me, how unique, how perfectly priceless it would be
for the ladies with whom Colonel Montgomery discussed the subject, to
find something—an insignificant something to be sure—which Colonel
Montgomery did not quite understand. Suppose those ladies had a sense
of humor. Suppose, after all, they did really know what were the earnings
per share on North American common and the source from which
their annual income—pardon me, Colonel Montgomery—their annual
cash realization, is derived.
I have before me a copy of a simple four-page folder issued on April
30, 1928, to every stockholder of record of The North American Company.
It says very clearly that the consolidated earnings for the twelve months
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ended March 31, 1928, were equal to $4.12 per share on the average num
ber of shares of North American common stock outstanding during the year,
compared with $3.90 per share the previous year. Every quarter for some
years past a similar statement has been sent to every stockholder and the
facts have been given due publicity through the financial pages of the
daily papers.
Assuming, however, that these ladies and some of the men who hold
stock in the company are entirely ignorant of the facts, what are the
disastrous consequences suffered by them as a result of their ignorance
combined with the dividend policy of The North American Company?
There must be something detrimental to these unfortunate stockholders,
some element of turpitude, because Colonel Montgomery suggests a
solution, to which I will refer later. The facts, however, do not appear
to support this view.
A stockholder who invested in North American common at the begin
ning of the year 1923, before the stock-dividend policy was adopted,
would have paid less than $25 a share for the stock and would have re
ceived thereafter stock dividends worth in the open market from say $2.20
to $5.00 or $6.00 a share each year. Assuming these stock dividends to
have been immediately sold, the original share bought in 1923 would
nevertheless have a market value at the present time of upwards of $70.
Despite the quarterly stock dividend of 2½ per cent., with the resultant
increase in number of shares outstanding, the asset value behind each
share at March 31, 1928, was 157 per cent of the corresponding figure at
December 31, 1922. That asset value increased $1.44 per share in the
last twelve months alone. In 1922 the earnings per share were $3.28;
in the twelve months ended March 31st they were $4.12.
There is nothing remarkable in any of these figures, possibly. Other
successful companies have done as well or better. But what is there in
them harmful or adverse to the stockholder which calls for any solution?
May I venture to answer my own question in one way in which I am sure
the words will spring to the lips of Colonel Montgomery? I think he may
say (I do not know what else he can say), that such a stockholder whose
original share in December, 1922, represented a one two-million-onehundred-and-eight-thousand, five-hundred-and-eightieth part of the total
equity while on April 1,1928 that share represented only a one four-millionseven-hundred-forty-two-thousand, eight-hundred-sixty-first part (stock
having been issued for property as well as for stock dividends during the
five-year period), has sacrificed a part of his proportionate ownership in
the company. This can not be denied. It can not, however, be advanced
seriously as a practical objection to the stock-dividend policy. The
stockholder has the option of retaining the dividend stock, and a very
large proportion of the stockholders do so. One hundred shares of stock
purchased early in 1923 is represented by approximately 163 shares at the
present time. But even that does not represent the same proportionate
share in the equity. The answer, in fact, to this purely hypothetical argu
ment is that practical expediency and the law itself recognize the desira
bility for dilution of the equity, in depriving stockholders of their preemp
tive right to subscribe in the case of stock issued for property. What
difference is there, other than a purely theoretical and impractical one, be
tween surrendering to a third party a share of new stock issued for prop
erty and surrendering a share of dividend stock representing profits
invested in new property?
The public-utility industry is one in which vast amounts of capital
are needed. The property and plant account of the North American
properties at December 31, 1922, amounted to $188,860,469 and at
March 31, 1928, (including additional properties acquired) to $620,384,338, a more than threefold increase. Does the average stockholder
wish to increase his investment in a corporation in any such proportion
in a little more than five years? Adherence to the hidebound policy of
proportionate ownership would, particularly in the acquisition of new
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properties, tend seriously to retard progress. It is of importance only to
individuals or interests who desire to retain legal control of a company
and in the public-utility industry such people must have a very long purse.
While it does not appear to me that the soundness of the stock-dividend
policy has been effectively challenged in any sense, may I attempt in a
few words to enunciate some of the principles upon which it rests. Per
haps Colonel Montgomery has not yet unmasked his batteries. His
letter may be no more than a tracer bullet or trial balloon. When he
really opens fire it may be useful to know what he is shooting at, as far as
I can outline it. The factors underlying the stock-dividend policy are in
my opinion as follows:
1. The growth of population, the increased demand for electricity for
industrial and domestic uses and the extension of power and light
systems into new territory have called for many years past and for
many years to come bid fair to call for the investment of new capital
on a scale more than great enough to absorb all of the net earnings
of the successful and progressive companies in this field.
2. If the new capital is properly invested as part of a well balanced
financial plan, it can be made to earn approximately the same return
per dollar invested as the original capital, subject perhaps to funda
mental economic changes which will, however, if they occur, be
likely to reflect themselves in modifications of the percentage of
yield to market price throughout the entire capital structure.
3. If the percentage of earnings available for common stock to the net
asset value represented by that stock is greater than the percentage
of increase in the number of shares of common stock, then (a) the
net asset value behind each share of stock and (b) the earnings per
share of stock will tend to increase in spite of the increase in the
number of shares outstanding.
4. It is undesirable from the point of view of the individual stockholder
simply to allow surplus to accumulate, with a resultant increase in
asset value, earnings and market value per share. To do so, even
assuming that stockholders themselves were satisfied with no dis
tribution of any kind, would simply invite abnormal fluctuations in
market price, attendant upon rumors of stock split-ups, special
stock dividends, etc. An outstanding issue of a comparatively small
number of shares in a company showing large assets and earnings
furnishes a fertile field for manipulation.
5. The payment of cash dividends and the concurrent issue to stock
holders of rights to subscribe to additional stock, even at a price
sufficiently below market to ensure the provision of needed new
capital from time to time, in many cases imposes upon stockholders
the necessity for paying into the company at irregular intervals, and
in comparatively large amounts, sums in excess of the amounts
withdrawn as dividends. Market prices are apt to fluctuate unduly
in anticipation of such rights. (Incidentally, stockholders who are
unable to subscribe or are not desirous of taking up their pro-rata
share of the new stock are deprived of their proportionate equity in
exactly the same way as stockholders who sell stock received as a
stock dividend; in fact, any objections which can be advanced
against stock dividends are inherent in aggravated form in the policy
of cash dividends with issue of rights.)
6. The sound and logical procedure in such a situation, therefore, con
sists in the payment of stock dividends at regular and frequent
intervals, at a uniform rate, which must be sufficiently below the
actual rate of earnings on the asset value of the common stock to
conform at all times to the principle laid down in paragraph 3 above.
The practice of The North American Company answers to this test.
This procedure involves the least amount of public financing, the
smallest degree of disturbance of market prices and affords the
maximum convenience to stockholders whether for retention of
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proportionate share of equity or for realization of increment arising
from earnings.
May I now be permitted to say a word regarding the so-called “solution”
suggested in the last paragraph of Colonel Montgomery’s letter? It is
true he speaks of it has having “occurred” to him and possibly did not
intend it to be regarded as a well considered statement of procedure. At
the same time it is only fair to the company to say that our auditors have
never, to my knowledge, made so illogical a suggestion. There is, obviously,
a direct connection between the rate of earnings and market price of stock.
The present market price of North American common is a direct reflec
tion of the rate of earnings per share. It does not appear to be affected
appreciably one way or the other by the stock dividend policy—it
certainly is not inflated because of it. It is a truer, less disturbed reflection
of earnings than is found in most cases, because the investing public knows
what can be counted upon in the way of distributions.
But the suggestion that the market value of the stock should be a con
trolling factor in the rate of distribution of dividends needs only to be
stated to be discredited. The price which the market is willing to pay for
earning power is an entirely extraneous factor from the point of view of
the company. The only consideration guiding the management is main
tenance of earning power, with an adequate margin of safety. The asser
tion that they must attempt to regulate rate of return (in the case of
stockholders who sell their dividend stock) to the percentage of earnings
to price prevailing from time to time in the market is not a “solution” of
anything; it is simply a proposed impediment upon an orderly and uni
form procedure carried out along sound lines. Any such plan as that
suggested would perish of ingrowing ineptitude. The reduced and varying
rate of issue of new stock would result in an irregular acceleration of the
earnings per share; this would, in turn, result in an increase in greater
proportion in the market price of the stock, calling for a continued reduc
tion in the number of shares of dividend stock to be issued. Over any
extended period, the cumulative effect might bring about a ridiculous
state of affairs.
If Colonel Montgomery argues that the market may not always ap
praise earning power on a six per cent. or lower basis, my answer is that
the procedure now being followed is happily applicable whether earning
power is appraised at 6 per cent. or 12 per cent.
The common stock of the company had a par value prior to April,
1927, at which time the stock was changed into an identical number of
shares without par value. Prior to the change the dividend stock was
charged against surplus at its par value. Does Colonel Montgomery take
exception to that procedure? Subsequent to the change, the old par
value was adopted as the stated value of the no par value stock, and the
company has continued to charge the same amount per share against
surplus with respect to all stock dividends. The stock has, in Colonel
Montgomery’s opinion, assuredly “suffered a sea-change” of a somewhat
violent character if a treatment so thoroughly inconsistent with its former
par value status as that which he suggests is demanded.
It has been said that the Puritans disapproved of bear-baiting, not be
cause it gave pain to the bear but because it gave pleasure to the spec
tators. There may be some analogous reason for Colonel Montgomery’s
objection to The North American Company’s policy of stock dividends.
They do no visible harm, they work no apparent injustice, but they do
under existing conditions give a stockholder, who realizes the dividend stock,
a return greater than the earnings per share shown by the company’s
profits. If there be any impropriety in this I must acknowledge a mental
blind spot. I cannot see it. Let us consider for a moment, however, a
similar situation arising under another form of procedure. The American
Telephone and Telegraph Company is one of the outstanding corpora
tions of the world from many points of view and is generally regarded as
a conservatively managed business from the financial standpoint. In
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1927 its earnings amounted to $13.22 per share; in 1928 they will possibly
exceed that figure slightly. The company pays an annual cash dividend
of $9 per share and has recently issued to its stockholders rights to sub
scribe to new stock which have a market value of $14 for the rights at
taching to each share. In other words, with earnings of $13.22 per share,
the stockholders receive a return of $23 a share. The “solution” would,
of course, have been to issue the new stock, not at $100 a share but at
some higher price more nearly approximating the market price of $180 a
share existing before the issue of the rights, and following Colonel Mont
gomery’s theory the amount carried to capital account should be the
market value of the stock. There has so far, however, been no suggestion
of impropriety in the course followed by the management of that company.
Incidentally the abrupt rise of twenty points which occurred in this con
servative investment stock is an example of what can so easily happen
under the plan of cash-dividend-plus-rights.
I beg you to accept my apologies for the length of this letter. The
matter, however, is not one which can be dismissed in a few words.
Yours truly,

Herbert C. Freeman.

These letters raise many interesting questions on financing
procedure. The matter is of importance and we shall welcome
expression of other opinions from the readers of this magazine.

The corporation commissioner of Cali
Investment Trusts and
fornia
recently promulgated rules for
the American Investor
the conduct and control of investment
trusts in that state which are of importance to the whole country.
Indeed, it is not improbable that the example set in California
will be followed in many other jurisdictions. Twenty years ago
the investment trust was practically unknown in this country.
In Great Britain the plan was initiated long before it found favor
here and some of the most profitable securities known in the
British Isles are the shares in the trusts established years ago.
The principle of diversified investment for the small capitalist
appealed to the conservatism of the British. It was recognized
that it was perilous to carry all one’s eggs in one basket. But
for some reason, which has not been explained, the investment
trust did not meet a welcome here until within a very few years.
Perhaps the American investor preferred to make his selection of
securities for himself—it is rather typically American to refuse
advice and assistance. Perhaps the plan was not properly pre
sented. But more probably the objection was that there were no
great prospects of extraordinary profits. We all like to adven
ture on voyages to Golconda and care not overmuch for the
slow and steady returns from trafficking on travelled seas. It is
alluring to think of market profits, fabulous earnings for stock
holders, mounting figures on the ticker tape. Beside these
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possibilities how tame and humdrum is the mere participation in
a reasonably safe trust. Whatever the reason may have been,
it is undeniable that the investment trust was not popular until
some time after the war. Now several score have been formed.
Their shares are sold quite readily. Their profits in a brief ex
periment have been satisfactory. We may take it, then, that the
plan has become an element of our financial structure, and the
question of control is, therefore, vital. The American investor,
having decided that he will buy and keep stocks of such institu
tions, it is certain that he will call for substantial quantities of
them. There is a vast amount of money seeking useful employ
ment—in all probability there has never been in the history of
the world so much available monetary wealth in any one other
nation as there is today in the United States. It may not be an
altogether blessed condition, but its existence is acknowledged.
A great deal of this surplus cash has already gone and more will
go into exchange for securities of a newcomer, the investment
trust.
Consequently, it is incumbent upon all
Control of Investment
the states to safeguard, in every sensi
Trusts
ble way, the interests of the people and
to regulate sufficiently the operations of the companies which
undertake to reinvest the funds of the people deposited with
them in trust—for that is really what an investment trust does.
It is said that about fifteen per cent. of the investment capital
of the United States is concentrated in California, and it is not
astonishing therefore to find that a progressively governed state
with so large a part of the nation’s wealth in its jurisdiction
should take prompt and effective measures to ensure fair play.
The principal provisions in the new system of rules have been
published in the Bulletin of the American Institute of Account
ants, and it is not necessary to repeat them here, but there is one
requirement which is peculiarly significant. Every investment
trust conducting business in California must submit to the cor
poration commissioner’s department financial reports showing
assets and liabilities, including all contingent liabilities, and de
tailed statements of profit and loss. These statements must be
presented twice a year and they must be prepared by independent
certified public accountants. The reports must show whether
the securities are carried at cost or market values and all securi
ties must be listed. Finally—and this is one of the most salutary
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points—all such reports and statements must be sent to every
holder of shares or certificates of participation in the trust. The
other rules laid down by the commissioner are equally sound
and protective. In a word, it seems that the man who desires to
purchase shares of investment trusts in California may do so
without serious misgiving or danger. Of course, there may come
times of widespread depression when whatever securities one
holds will be sadly affected and values generally will fall. Noth
ing can give absolute assurance of prosperity. But a scheme of
distributed investment under rigid and intelligent supervision
of the state offers as much as one can expect outside the safe
but unremunerative realm of government bonds. The Califor
nia requirement that explicit information shall be given the share
holder is all good. It seems to afford a splendid example for the
rest of the financial interests of the country. We come slowly into
the way of ideally perfect procedure but we advance nevertheless.
In the present case California may have stepped out ahead of the
ranks but she will be overtaken by the rest.
Striking testimony to the increasing
Value of Accountants’
value of accountants’ certificates was
Certificates
given at a recent meeting of the London
members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England
and Wales by F. C. Goodenough, chairman of Barclays Bank,
Limited. Barclays Bank, as most of our readers know, is one of
the largest and most powerful of the financial institutions of
Great Britain, and anything which the chairman of that bank
says may be regarded as worthy of careful and prayerful atten
tion. With the single exception of the Bank of England itself
there is no bank in the British dominions which exercises an
influence greater than Barclays. Mr. Goodenough refrained
from reading a lesson to his hearers. He was not bent upon
lecturing the accountants nor upon pointing out to them what
they should or should not do to make plain and easy the task of
the banker. What he said was more a message to the banker to
avail himself to the full of the help which the accountant alone
can render. Here is the gist of his remarks:
“What has always attracted me most of all in your many-sided pro
fession has been the constructive opportunities which it offers from a
business point of view, and this it shares in common with the bankers.
To my mind the chief attraction in the business of the banker lies in the
knowledge that, provided the banker manages his own business well and
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carefully, he has the power of rendering great service to the community
as a whole, by creating, improving and encouraging business.
“It is in these days of slow but sure recovery from deep depression
that constructive ability will be of the greatest service.
“I have seen the business of Barclays Bank increase, within a period of
thirty years, from assets of a value of £30,000,000 to a figure exceeding
£350,000,000, apart from a further £100,000,000 of assets belonging to
its subsidiaries, and our institution today is infinitely stronger and more
effective than at any previous time in its history, whilst the services
which it has rendered throughout to the public in general and the business
community in particular are immeasurably great. Other institutions
have doubtless had the like experience, and I am not claiming that the
experience of Barclays Bank is in any way unique.
“In all these great movements the chartered accountant has played a
great and important part, and I have had the handling of many construc
tive propositions of great importance and have solved many intricate
problems of figures with the help of the chartered accountants.
“These great institutions, which have been built up in recent years,
will form the sure foundations for greater commercial enterprise and
prosperity in the future.
“ In these days of great business institutions which are forced upon us
by competition, the work of the auditors in their perennial or annual
audit is of the utmost value not only to the shareholders and to the
public, but also to those who may be carrying on the business.
“The bankers today place increasing reliance upon the expert analysis
of their own and their customers’ accounts which is undertaken by their
auditors.
“I feel myself that these investigations and the auditors’ certificates
are deserving of greater weight and importance in the eyes of the public
and of the shareholders than an over-elaborate statement of details
which may not convey much to the reader but may be prejudicial to the
interests of the business to which it relates. It is, of course, understood
that the accountants cannot undertake the responsibility of valuing
certain classes of assets that appear in the balance-sheet, in regard to
which they have no expert knowledge, but they would take every reason
able care to satisfy themselves that the assets stand in the balance-sheet
at a figure which is not more than a fair and legitimate value.
“I am confident that the business sense of the chartered accountant
will be directed towards preserving a true balance between the tendency
towards mechanisation and standardisation of the present day and the
maintenance of sufficient freedom for the conduct of a business upon
reasonable business lines and for the encouragement of individual effort
and skill. It is individual effort and skill which will lead to expansion of
business in the future.”

This is a message charged with deep meaning to all who are con
cerned. Perhaps its salient feature is the reference to the com
parative importance of details and certificates. Some people in
this country are inclined to rely excessively on the facts, small
and great, which are contained in statements, and to regard
lightly the conclusions of the accountant which are summed up
in his certificate. And yet it is to the certificate that the chief
interest attaches. In the editorial pages of this magazine we
have repeatedly endeavored to lay stress upon the necessity for
reading and heeding the accountant’s certificate. That is the
whole matter in brief. All the details of the report, schedules,
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comparisons, etc. are only the supports upon which it stands.
Many readers of the financial statements of a company are
unable to understand what the printed figures mean, but the
accountant is supposed to be competent to summarize the entire
story in a condensed expression of opinion. He knows what his
marshalled statistics reveal and in his certificate he tells the truth
as he sees it for the benefit of the reader who lacks technical
knowledge. It would be an excellent thing for the business world
here if all our bankers grasped, as the chairman of Barclays
evidently grasps, the essential factors of the case and placed
the emphasis where it belongs—upon the certificate not the sub
ordinate details.
Sometimes an accountant finds himself
Has an Accountant
a Lien Upon Books? in an unhappy state of doubt as to the
ability to collect his fees from clients.
Naturally this should not happen often, because an accountant
is, as a rule, fairly well acquainted with the financial responsi
bility of his clients. But occasionally he accepts cases which are
not all that they should be, and then he wonders when and how
he will collect. Recently a question arose as to the rights of the
accountant to retain the books of the client pending payment of
fees. Apparently in this case there was reason to believe that the
debt might remain a debt. As this was a question of law, the
inquiry was referred to counsel for the American Institute of
Accountants and the following opinion was received:
“I have your letter of May 17 submitting the following question:
“‘If an accountant takes the books of a client to the account
ant’s office where he brings them up-to-date in making the necessary
entries, is the accountant entitled to hold the books until his fee for
the services has been paid? ’
“The privilege of detaining and holding possession of some particular
property of another as security for some debt or obligation has been
extended in a variety of cases where persons by their labor and skill have
imparted an additional value to the goods. For example, artisans, trades
men, mechanics and laborers who receive property for the purpose of
mending, repairing and improving its condition have by common law a
lien on such property until the reasonable charges for their labor and
expenses thereon are paid.
“An accountant who makes entries in books placed in his possession
for that purpose seems to occupy a similar position, and I am of the opin
ion that if that were the simple case presented he could hold the books
until the reasonable fees for his services had been paid, assuming, of course,
that there was no express contract to the contrary. However, if the
accountant is given the books to make an audit and he does not put any
entries in the books and does nothing to the books themselves, I should
not think he would have a common-law lien or any lien on the books
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unless there is some express contract to that effect or a statute in the
particular jurisdiction providing for such a lien.
“If the case involved both questions, that is, putting entries in the books
and doing other work, I should not think his lien would extend to any
thing more than the reasonable services for putting entries in the books,
that is, for the work upon the books themselves.
“This view is supported by the case of Burleigh v. Clark, which you will
find reported in The Accountant for 1901 at page 65, where a distinction
was made between an auditor and an accountant and where it was held
that the accountant had a lien on such books only as he had actually
worked upon in respect of his proper remuneration for work upon those
books only. In Scott Shoe Machinery Company v. Broaker, 71 N. Y. S.
1023, it was held that an accountant employed simply to examine books
of account had no lien thereon for his services.”

There seems to be no valid reason to differ from the opinion of
counsel in this case, much as it might appear desirable to with
hold the books until the fees had been paid. Perhaps the fees
will never be collected. The only solace for the afflicted account
ant in such a plight is that he has paid for a lesson in precaution—
and that perhaps is not much solace after all.
A correspondent who has been reading
some of the comments in past issues of
this magazine on the subject of absurd
qualifications in the accountant’s certificate has been inspired to
versification. The pages of The Journal of Accountancy are
not often opened to verse, but every rule must be broken now
and then. The poet in this instance may not be a master of his
craft, but his words are as goads.
Qualifications Gone
Mad

“We have audited this balance-sheet and say in our report
That the cash is overstated, the cashier being short;
That the customers’ receivables are very much past due;
That if there are some good ones they are very, very few;
That the invent’ries are out of date and principally junk;
That the method of their pricing is very largely bunk;
That, according to our figures, the undertaking’s wrecked,
But, subject to these comments, the balance-sheet’s correct.”

Furthermore we venture to affirm that if such a certificate bore
the name of a reputable firm of accountants—assuming for the
sake of argument that any reputable firm would sign such a
certificate, which of course is unthinkable—we could find bankers
who would read only the name of the signatory and ignore both
rhyme and reason.
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